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by other cognitive factors such as momen-
tary attention.
Nobre  et al.  (2008),  building  on  their 
and others’ earlier work, have conducted 
a very interesting study that does just this; 
they have investigated, using behavioral and 
physiological measures, the effects of atten-
tion on representations held in one form of 
mental store – visual short term memory 
(VSTM).  VSTM  is  a  short-term  (a few 
seconds)  limited-capacity  store  of  visual 
information (e.g., Zhang and Luck, 2008). 
Nobre  et  al.  (2008)  investigated  whether 
the  retrieval  of  information  from VSTM 
could be influenced by focused attention. 
The authors utilized a paradigm similar to 
those used in studies of the effects of covert 
selective attention on vision using predictive 
precues (e.g., Mangun and Hillyard, 1991). 
However, instead of precuing the location to 
which attention should be directed in future, 
the authors used retrodictive cues (spatial 
retro-cues) that indicated the location of a 
relevant target in an array presented in the 
past  (1–2 s  previously)  with  100%  prob-
ability. In comparison to neutral retro-cues 
that gave no information about the likely 
location in the array of the relevant item, 
performance to indicate whether a subse-
quently presented probe stimulus had in fact 
been anywhere in the array was improved 
with the spatial retro-cues. Importantly, the 
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In his visionary writings in the 19th century, 
American psychologist James (1890) wrote 
about attention describing it in part as:
“…the taking possession of the mind, 
in clear and vivid form, one out of what 
seem several simultaneously possible 
objects or trains of thought.”
Over the course of the ensuing century, 
especially  in  the  past  60 years,  researchers 
investigating  the  mechanisms  of  attention 
have identified important behavioral and neu-
ral correlates of attention, which include the 
findings that attention influences the process-
ing of sensory stimuli by improving percep-
tion and performance for attended stimuli 
versus unattended stimuli (e.g., Cherry, 1953; 
Posner, 1978), and that such effects can involve 
changes in sensory-neural signals early in the 
sensory hierarchy for auditory (e.g., Hillyard 
et al.,  1973),  visual  (e.g., Van  Voorhis  and 
Hillyard,  1977)  and  somatosensory  (e.g., 
Desmedt and Robertson, 1977) stimuli.
However, as James’ quote makes it clear, 
selective attention not only involves select-
ing  between  competing  external  signals, 
but also acting to select between internal 
and external signals, and perhaps as well 
between  competing  internal  signals  held 
in  short-  or  long-term  memory  stores. 
I recall vividly that my late father George 
H. Mangun, a biochemist, could withdraw 
almost completely from the welter of our 
living room when my brother, sister and 
I were engaged in childhood mischief and 
mayhem. When he was focused on a diffi-
cult scientific problem, we had to physically 
leap on him to capture his attention. I asked 
him about this once, in amazement of his 
formidable mental sound-proofing, and he 
told me that he perfected the skill in college 
in order to study without being distracted. 
As a child I was not wholly convinced, but 
as an attention researcher (and a parent of 
two young boys myself!), I now understand 
the powerful nature of the human attention 
system for modulating sensory processing. 
Surprisingly,  in  contrast  to  work  on  the 
effects of attention on sensory inputs, very 
little work has addressed how attention can 
be turned inward to select from purely men-
tal representations. There is no doubt that 
this paucity of research has to do with the 
simple fact that it is challenging to develop 
reliable measures of mental representations 
in the first place, and still harder to measure 
how such representations may be affected 
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spatial retro-cues were found to increasingly 
benefit the observers when the number of 
items in the array increased.
Recordings of event-related potentials 
(ERPs) also revealed brain potentials related 
to search in VSTM. Nobre et al. (2008) found 
a brain potential and labeled it the N3RS, 
which showed systematic changes in ampli-
tude and duration that mirrored the behav-
ioral findings during search. Interestingly, 
the ERP covaried with the degree of search 
required during the neutral retro-cue tri-
als in which subjects did not benefit from 
retrodictive spatial cues.
Overall, the findings add support to the 
idea that voluntary attention can influence 
internal  mental  processing,  like  search 
through  VSTM.  Models  that  argue  for 
immutable storage of VSTM are not com-
patible  with  the  findings.  However,  the 
research suggests that William James’ intro-
spections on attention are as rich as they 
appear at first reading, and that the focus 
of the mind’s eye can be turned inward, to 
affect internal mental processes, as well as 
outward to modulate the processing of sen-
sory inputs from the world around us.
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ferences and how the differences can affect 
stress-cognitive-emotional interactions.
In a research report published in Frontiers 
in  Behavioral  Neuroscience,  Brinks  et al. 
(2007) have specifically addressed these two 
key issues. The authors took advantage of the 
known drastic differences in the responsive-
ness of stress systems in two inbred strains of 
mice, BALB/c and C57BL/6J –   respectively 
high and low stress-responsive – and stud-
ied how the differences were related to neu-
roendocrine and behavioral responses of 
the mice to emotion- and cognition-biased 
situations. The authors also studied how 
exposure to predator stress affected both 
behavioral and neuroendocrine responses. 
The study revealed intriguing relationships 
between the expression of the two corticos-
teroid receptors in brain regions typically 
involved in the emotion-cognition interplay 
(hippocampus,  amygdala,  and  prefrontal 
cortex), animals’ glucocorticoid reactivity, 
and the performance and learning strategy 
followed when learning a spatial task.
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Emotion and cognition were not long ago 
considered as independent brain functions 
with respective underlying neural systems 
working in parallel and only occasionally 
interacting.  This  earlier  perspective  con-
sidered that the main focus of Behavioral 
Neuroscience was to understand the neu-
robiological  basis  of  cognition,  which 
was considered as a “cold” mode of brain 
functioning. “Hot” emotional systems were 
regarded as inferior and not central for the 
eventual understanding of how the human 
brain  works.  This  view  has  drastically 
changed in the past two decades with an 
increasing number of studies pointing out 
not only to a close interaction between emo-
tion and cognition, but also to their true 
integration in the production of behavior 
(Pessoa, 2008).
Fearful experiences usually become part 
of our strongest memories. The uneasiness 
we feel when having difficulties to take a deci-
sion in a family-relevant conflict can greatly 
determine our ability to eventually choose 
an appropriate solution. These are just two 
examples of how the intricacy between the 
so-called emotional and cognitive functions 
really  operates  together.  In  recent  years, 
much progress has been done both on the 
phenomenological characterization of such 
interplay and on the identification of the 
neural circuits and molecules that sustain 
cognitive-emotional behaviors (Phelps and 
LeDoux,  2005;  Richter-Levin  and  Akirav, 
2003); however, there are at least two key 
issues to understand the whole picture that 
has been so far largely disregarded. One issue 
is the key standing role of stress systems. The 
other issue is the question of individual dif-